Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents? by Cox, James & Hayne, Stephen
Georgia State University 
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University 
ExCEN Working Papers Experimental Economics Center 
1-1-2006 
Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents? 
James Cox 
Georgia State University 
Stephen Hayne 
Georgia State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers 
Recommended Citation 
Cox, James and Hayne, Stephen, "Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents?" (2006). 
ExCEN Working Papers. 125. 
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/excen_workingpapers/125 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Experimental Economics Center at ScholarWorks @ 
Georgia State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in ExCEN Working Papers by an authorized 
administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@gsu.edu. 
Barking Up the Right Tree: Are Small Groups Rational Agents? 
By James C. Cox and Stephen C. Hayne* 
Abstract 
Both mainstream economics and its critics have focused on models of individual rational agents even 
though most important decisions are made by small groups. Little systematic work has been done to 
study the behavior of small groups as decision-making agents in markets and other strategic games. This 
may limit the relevance of both economics and its critics to the objective of developing an understanding 
of how most important decisions are made. In order to gain some insight into this issue, this paper 
compares group and individual economic behavior. The objective of the research is to learn whether 
there are systematic differences between decisions made by groups and individual agents in market 
environments characterized by risky outcomes. A quantitative measure of deviation from minimally-
rational decisions is used to compare group and individual behavior in common value auctions. 
   
1.  Introduction 
A central feature of mainstream twentieth century economics is its reliance on models of individual 
rational decision-making.  Criticism of economics usually focuses on conclusions about empirical failure 
of rational agent models.  Much of this criticism comes from cognitive psychology or from economists 
with backgrounds in cognitive psychology or behavioral science.  Indeed, critical discourse on rational 
choice models is often framed as a contest between economic theory and the falsifying evidence from 
cognitive psychology. An example that illustrates this point is provided by Hogarth and Reder (1987), 
the published record of a conference on economics and psychology. 
  A problem shared by economics, its critics, and its defenders is that they all appear to be “barking 
up the wrong tree” in focusing on the use of, or criticisms of, models of individual rational agents.1  This 
statement follows from observing that most important economic, political, legal, scientific, cultural, and 
military decisions are made by groups. Decision-making groups have many forms including families, 
management teams, boards of directors, central bank boards, juries, appellate courts, committees of 
various types, and legislatures. Decision-making responsibility may be assigned to groups, rather than 
individuals, because of a belief that (a) important pieces of information are possessed by different 
individual members of groups and/or (b) groups are inherently more rational than individual decision-
makers.  Whether groups make better decisions than individuals in some or all environments and, if they 
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do, whether this reflects an advantage from having more information available, are empirical questions. 
Many researchers in psychology and management science have previously studied group 
decision-making. Our research involves three important departures from previous work in that we 
conduct the experiments in an environment in which (a) groups compete in strategic market games, (b) 
the distinct information possessed by individual group members is varied as an experimental treatment, 
and (c) the extent to which a group’s decisions depart from rationality is quantitatively measured. 
We compare group and individual decision-making in the context of bidding in common value 
auctions.  Auction market bids are commonly decided by groups.  For example, oil companies typically 
use committees of geologists and managers to formulate bidding strategies (Capen, Clapp, and 
Campbell, 1971; Hoffman, Marsden, and Saidi, 1991).  Many general contractors bring several people 
together to build a bid package (Dyer and Kagel, 1996).  In this strategic decision-making environment, 
are there grounds for expecting groups to perform better (or perhaps worse) than individuals? 
In a common value auction, the value of the auctioned item is the same to all bidders but the 
bidders do not know that value at the time they make their bids.  If all N bidders in the market have 
unbiased estimates of the item’s value, and use the same monotonically increasing bidding strategy, then 
the high bidder will be the one with the most optimistic estimate.  But the highest of N unbiased 
estimates is biased upwards and, if bidders do not take into account this property of order statistics, then 
winning bidders can on average pay more for auctioned items than they turn out to be worth.  This 
phenomenon is known as the “winner’s curse” (Capen, Clapp, and Campbell, 1971).   
The winner’s curse cannot occur if all bidders are rational (Cox and Isaac, 1984, 1986), and 
therefore evidence of the winner’s curse in market settings is considered by Thaler (1988, 1992) to be an 
anomaly.  But avoidance of the winner’s curse is not an easy task: it requires bidders to be able to 
distinguish between the expected value of the auctioned item, conditioned only on the prior information 
available (their value estimates), and the expected value of the item conditioned on winning the auction.   
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Authors of numerous papers on experiments with common value auctions (e.g., Thiel, 1975; 
Bazerman and Samuelson, 1983a,b; Kagel and Levin, 1986; Kagel, et al., 1989; Lind and Plott, 1991; 
Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout, 2001) have reported that bidders often suffer from the winner’s curse.  But 
all of these previous experiments have involved bids decided by individuals. The implications of this 
research for group bidding behavior are unknown. 
 One reason why firms and other organizations bring several people together to decide on a bid may 
be their conjecture that group members have different information available about the auctioned item or, 
if the information is common to all group members, that it may be open to individual interpretations.  
Alternatively, firms may have bids decided on by groups because of a belief that groups are more 
rational than individuals in the strategic environment of the common value auction.  If groups have more 
information than individuals, and groups utilize their information no less rationally than do individuals, 
then it would obviously follow that group performance would be better than individual performance in 
auctions.  But the actual relative performance of groups and individuals in common value auctions is an 
empirical question that we address with our experiments. 
We report results from experiments designed to provide comparisons of individual and group 
bidding behavior.  If group bidding differs from individual bidding, this could result from groups having 
more information or, alternatively, better or worse judgment.  This distinction is examined by crossing 
an information density (signal sample size) treatment with the bidding entity (groups or individuals) 
treatment in the experimental design. 
2.  Previous Research on Group vs. Individual Decisions 
Kerr, MacCoun, and Kramer (1996) review literature on decisions of small groups to find out whether 
they are less or more subject to judgmental errors than individuals.  Kerr, et al. concluded that the data 
imply that group decisions can attenuate, amplify, or simply reproduce the decision biases of individuals 
and suggested that these findings can be explained by the nature of the decision task. 
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A task is defined as intellective if there is a normative criterion for evaluating the quality of a 
decision, and as judgmental if no such criterion exists (Laughlin, 1980; Laughlin and Ellis, 1986; 
McGrath, 1984).  Intellective tasks are further divided on the basis of their “demonstrability”; highly 
demonstrable tasks are those where the argument prescribed by the normative model is self-evidently 
correct (Gigone and Hastie, 1993; Laughlin and Ellis, 1986).   This leads to the prediction that groups 
will outperform individuals on highly demonstrable tasks (Laughlin, et al., 1976; Laughlin and Ellis, 
1986; Davis, 1992).  Cason and Mui (1997) study individual and group decisions in the dictator game 
and explore the group polarization hypothesis (Isenberg, 1986) that group decision-making selects 
extreme rather than modal individual outcomes. Blinder and Morgan (2005) report that groups make 
better decisions than individuals in two macro economy “steering” tasks.  Bornstein (1992) reports that 
groups offer less and are willing to accept less in the ultimatum game and Bornstein and Yaniv (1998) 
suggest that the subgame perfect equilibrium argument (“player 2 should accept any positive offer since 
anything is better than nothing”), when voiced, had a decisive effect on group decisions.  Cooper and 
Kagel (forthcoming) report that two person groups play more strategically than individuals in signaling 
games. 
Although a few of the group behavior experiments cited in the preceding paragraph involve 
strategic games, none involve markets. We experiment with group and individual behavior in the context 
of a market for which there is a quantitative measure of deviation from minimally rational decisions.  
3.  Rational Bidding in Common Value Auctions 
There may be various reasons why groups have responsibility for making decisions, not the least of 
which is the possibility that each individual will bring some distinct information to the process.  In 
section 3.2 we develop a formal representation of the advantage of having more information about the 
value of the auctioned item.  But first consider the information environment commonly used in previous 
research on common value auctions with individual bidders. 
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3.1  Implications of an Individual Estimate of Value 
Consider a first-price sealed-bid auction in which bidders do not know the value of the item being sold 
when they bid and the value v of the item is the same for all bidders. Suppose that each bidder receives 
an independent signal si  that provides an unbiased estimate of the item’s value. The expected value of 
the item conditional on the bidder’s signal is written as )|( isvE .  The expected value of the auctioned 
item conditional on the bidder’s own signal being the highest of N signals (i.e., equal to the highest order 
statistic, yN ) is written as ).|( Ni ysvE =  For bids by N > 1 bidding entities, one has 
(1)              )|()|( Niii ysvEssvE =>=  
by well-known properties of order statistics.  Statement (1) implies that if bidders naively submit bids 
equal to their common value estimates then they will have an expected loss from winning the auction; 
that is, they will suffer from the winner’s curse. 
 The comparison between the unconditional and conditional expected values in statement (1) can 
be quantified by considering the case where the common value of the auctioned item is uniformly 
distributed on [ , ]v vl h  and each individual agent’s signal is independently drawn from the uniform 
distribution on [ , ]v v− +θ θ .  For this case, one has 
(2) θ
1
1)|()|( +
−−=−=
N
NsvEysvE iNi , 
for all ],[ θθ −+∈ hi vvs ? .  Statement (2) implies that if bidders naively submit bids equal to their 
common value estimates then they will have an expected loss in the amount )1/()1( +− NNθ .  This 
expected loss is increasing in the number of bidders N. 
3.2  The Advantage from More Information 
Next consider the case where each bidder has S > 1 signals (or estimates) of the value of the auctioned 
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item that are independently drawn from the uniform distribution on [ , ]v v− +θ θ . The signal sample 
midrange mi provides an unbiased estimate of the value of the auctioned item when the signals are drawn 
from a uniform distribution. The expected value of the auctioned item conditional on the bidder’s signal 
sample midrange is denoted by )|( imvE . The expected value of the auctioned item conditional on the 
bidder’s own signal sample midrange being the highest of N signal sample midranges (i.e., equal to the 
highest order statistic of sample midranges, Nz ) depends on the sample’s range ri and is denoted by 
),|( Nii zmrvE = .  With signals drawn from the uniform distribution, one has 
(3) 
1
2
1 1( | , ) ( | )
1 2( 1)
1( )
1
i i N i i
i
N NE v r m z E v m r
N N
N r
N
θ
θ
− −= − = − ++ +
−= − −+
 
Comparison of the right hand side of equation (2) with the second line of equation (3) reveals that 
bidders with S > 1 signals will have smaller expected losses from naive bidding than will bidders with a 
single estimate of value.   
Equation (3) provides a measure of the size of the winner’s curse that may be exhibited by 
winning bidder i in a market with N bidders: 
(4)         ),|( N
w
i
w
i
w
i zmrvEbEVCurse =−=   
where wib  is the winning bid, v is the common value of the auctioned item, 
w
ir  is the winning bidder’s 
signal sample range, wim  is the winning bidder’s signal sample midrange, and Nz  is the Nth order 
statistic of sample midranges (or signals, for signal sample size 1).  Since EVCurse is the size of the 
expected loss (or profit, if it is negative) from winning the auction, it provides a quantitative criterion for 
determining the extent of deviation from minimally-rational bidding in common value auctions.  
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 In order not to have an expected loss from winning, a bidder with signal sample with midrange 
m  and range r  must bid no more than the amount ),|( N
w
i
w
i zmrvE = .  As shown by equation (3), a 
bidder must discount it’s naive estimate of the common value (its signal or its signal sample midrange) 
by at least the amount )1/()1)(( 21 +−− NNrθ in order to have nonnegative expected profit from 
bidding (where it is understood that r = 0 for signal samples of size 1). The size of this minimum rational 
discount (MRD) is independent of the value of the signal sample midrange im  so long as 
],[ θθ −+∈ hi vvm ? .  This condition is essentially always satisfied by the signals drawn in our 
experiments in which 1800=θ  and ]22500,2500[],[ =hvv? . The size of MRD is monotonically 
increasing in the size of the market (or number of bidders) N except in the improbable extreme case 
where the signal sample range r equals 2θ , the range of the support for the probability distribution of 
signals.  In contrast, the size of MRD is monotonically decreasing in the signal sample range r.  The 
reason for negative monotonicity of  MRD in r is intuitively clear because r provides a measure of how 
informative the signal sample is: (a) if r = 2θ  then MRD = 0  because in that case the bidder knows the 
value of the auctioned item with certainty (it is equal to the value of the smallest signal plus r); and (b) if  
r = 0 then MRD  equals )1/()1( +− NNθ , the same amount as in the customary single signal case (see 
equation (2)), because in that case S > 1 signals don’t provide any more information about the value of 
the auctioned item than would a single signal. 
 The preceding analysis of the information content of signal samples shows that having S > 1 
signals should make it easier to avoid the winner’s curse than it is with a single signal.  But bidding 
behavior may be inconsistent with this prediction. It is known from previous experiments with individual 
subjects with single signals si that bidders do not sufficiently increase their discounts from si as market 
size N increases.  As a result, the winner’s curse has high incidence in N = 7 treatments but not in N = 3 
treatments (Kagel and Levin, 1986; Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout, 2001).  There may be a similar problem 
with variable signal sample range in multiple signal treatments.  A question that can be addressed with 
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our multiple signal treatments is whether bidders sufficiently increase their discounts from signal sample 
midrange as the sample range decreases so as to avoid the winner’s curse in multiple signal treatments.  
Further questions are concerned with the effects of interactions among market size, signal sample size, 
and composition of the bidding unit (individual or group).  
Deviations from minimally-rational bidding can be measured by linear regressions relating 
winning bids to the signal sample midranges and ranges of the winning bidders, as we do in section 6. 
Bids that yield zero expected profit are given by the following equation when ],[ θθ −+∈ hi vvm ? :  
(5) ii
Zero r
N
Nm
N
Nb
)1(2
1
1
1
+
−+++
−−= θ . 
Bids that are lower than Zerob have non-negative expected profit regardless of what rival bidders are 
bidding.  In contrast, bids that are higher than Zerob are not economically rational because they have non-
positive expected profit, that is, they exhibit the winner’s curse.2   Of course, a bid may be less than 
Zerob  but still higher than the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid for the bidder’s signal sample.  But that 
would not imply that the bid is irrational unless the bidder knew that all other bidders were bidding 
according to the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid function.  If rival bidders are bidding above the 
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium bid function then a bidder’s rational best reply may be to also bid higher than 
bids specified by the equilibrium bid function.  But it would never be rational to bid higher than 
Zerob because: (a) such bids have non-positive expected profit regardless of what rival bidders are 
bidding; and (b) such bids have negative expected profit if rival bidders are bidding no more than Zerob .    
In short, a bidder who bids above Zerob  will have negative expected profits unless there are “bigger 
fools” to save him from having the high bid by making bids with negative expected profits themselves.  
Therefore, it is comparison with Zerob that provides a strong test for rational bidding. Any bid above 
Zerob  is characterized by the winner’s curse, which is not rational bidding. 
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4.  Experimental Design: Signals, Bidders, and Markets 
Our design crosses: (a) bidding entity composition with (b) variable signal sample with (c) variable 
market size.  The rationale for several features of the design and protocol are as follows. 
4.1  Rationale for Varying the Signal Sample Size 
Group bidding may differ from individual bidding either because (a) groups are inherently more or less 
rational than individuals or (b) individual members of groups have distinct estimates of the value of the 
auctioned item. Exploration of the differences between individual and group bidding requires that one 
separate the effects of the composition of the bidding unit per se from the effects of signal sample size. 
We cross the bidding unit composition treatment with the signal sample size treatment.   
4.2  Rationale for Varying the Market Size 
We also “cross” a market size treatment (3 or 7 bidding units) with the bidding unit composition and 
signal sample size treatments.  The reason for varying the market size in this way is that previous 
researchers have found that once- or twice-experienced individual bidders in markets of size 3, where 
each individual has a signal sample size of 1, do not suffer the winner’s curse whereas in markets of size 
7 individual bidders with the same experience and signal information do suffer from the winner’s curse 
so badly that most of them go bankrupt (see, for example, Kagel and Levin, 1986).  We address the 
following questions with our experimental design:  (1) Do group bidders fare the same or differently 
than individual bidders in the 3-bidder and 7-bidder market sizes?  (2) Does the answer to question (1) 
depend on whether the group bidders have the same or larger signal sample sizes than the individual 
bidders?  (3) Do group and/or individual bidders with larger signal sample sizes fare the same or 
differently than they do with a signal sample size of 1 in the 3-bidder or 7-bidder market sizes? 
4.3  Rationale for Using Groups Consisting of Five Subjects 
Some of the literature on group behavior has questioned whether a 3 person group is large enough to 
elicit true “group” behavior.  In order to avoid potential criticisms that we did not use large enough 
groups in our experiments, we need to use groups of at least size 4.  Since some of our groups might try 
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to make decisions by voting on proposals, we want to avoid a group size that is an even number so as to 
always admit the possibility of a decisive majority vote.  We use groups of size 5.   
4.4  Rationale for Using Experienced Subjects 
Reports of results from previous common value auction experiments with individual bidders have 
focused on the behavior of experienced subjects, where “experience” means having participated in one 
or more previous common value auction experiments.  The reason for this is that most subjects fall 
victim to the winner’s curse in all experimental treatments when they are first-time bidders but such 
inexperienced behavior is not considered to be very interesting.  We use subject experience as a 
treatment to allow comparison of our results with those in the literature.   
4.5  Information and Repetition 
Both individuals and groups have opportunities to learn from experience about the implications of not 
discounting their signal sample estimates of the common value. This will occur both within treatment 
sessions and between treatments at different subject experience levels. Within-session learning can occur 
because treatment sessions consist of at least 30 rounds of bidding with information feedback.  After 
each round of bidding is concluded, all subjects are informed of the amount of the winning bid and the 
common value of the auctioned item, and therefore about the profit or loss realized by the high bidder.   
5.  Experiment Procedures  
Experiment sessions with individual bidders were conducted in the Economic Science Laboratory (ESL).  
Sessions with group bidders were conducted in the breakout rooms of the Decision Behavior Laboratory 
(DBL).  ESL and DBL are adjacent laboratories in McClelland Hall at the University of Arizona.  Each 
group or individual had its own personal computer that was connected to a local area network running 
customized auction software.  Subjects were recruited from the undergraduate student population.   
Treatments were implemented in three-day sequences of two-hour sessions.  Subject instructions 
contained a detailed description of the information environment of the common value auctions. Subjects 
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were informed in non-technical terms that in each auction round the computer would draw a value v for 
the auctioned item from the discrete uniform distribution on the integers greater than or equal to 2,500 
experimental dollars and less than or equal to 22,500 experimental dollars.  They were informed that the 
common value would not be revealed but that it would be the midpoint of a uniform distribution from 
which their value estimates, or signals, would be independently drawn. Subjects were informed in non-
technical terms that after the computer drew a common value v for a round it would draw all signals 
independently from the uniform distribution on [v-1800, v+1800].  
On day 1 of the three-day sequence, the inexperienced subjects first participated in 10 periods of 
practice auctions. After each practice auction, the subjects’ computer monitors displayed the common 
value, all subjects’ bids, and the amount won or lost by the high bidder.  The subjects were each given a 
capital endowment of 1,000 experimental dollars in order to allow them to make at least one sizable 
overbid without becoming bankrupt.  At the end of the practice rounds, the subjects’ profits and losses 
were set to zero and they began the 30 monetary payoff rounds with new 1,000 experimental dollar 
capital endowments.  The actual number of monetary-payoff rounds to be completed was not announced.  
During the monetary payoff rounds the information reported at the end of each auction included only the 
common value and the high bid, not the bids by other bidders.  We decided not to report all bids in order 
to make collusion difficult and to adopt procedures that correspond to minimal reporting requirements in 
non-laboratory auctions. The procedures were the same on day 2 as on day 1.  Procedures were the same 
on day 3 except that only the common value and high bid (rather than all bids) were reported in the 
practice rounds to further inhibit any attempts at collusion by the twice-experienced subjects. 
Signals were presented to the subjects on sheets of paper.  In treatments with signal sample size 
of 1, each subject was given a single sheet of paper with signals for 10 practice rounds and 40 monetary-
payoff rounds.  In the group-bidding treatments with signal sample size of 1, each member of a group 
had a sheet of paper with signals that were identical to the signals of other members of the same group 
but distinct from the signals of members of other groups.  In treatments with signal sample size of 5: (a) 
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each subject in an individual bidder experiment had 5 sheets of paper with independently-drawn signals; 
and (b) each subject in a group bidding experiment had 1 sheet of paper with independently-drawn 
signals.  Since the groups each had 5 members, each group in a treatment with signal sample size 5 had 
access to the same information as an individual subject in the individual-bidder treatment with the same 
signal sample size.  The groups were informed that they were free to use their signal sample sheets 
within their own breakout rooms during an experiment session any way that they wanted to. The 
experimenters collected all sheets of signals at the end of each session. 
Signals, common values, and bids were denominated in experimental dollars, with a clearly 
specified exchange rate into U.S. dollars, for two reasons.  The less important reason was that this made 
it easy to require that all bids be integers, thus avoiding the bid entry errors produced by subjects’ having 
to use decimal points in their responses.  The more important reason was to eliminate extraneous sources 
of variation across treatments.  We held constant the experimental-dollar capital endowments, sequence 
of common values, and (the relevant) signals across the market size, signal sample size, and 
group/individual bidder experimental treatments.  Thus the only source of variability across treatments 
came from the behavioral responses to the treatments.  Without use of a variable exchange rate from 
experimental dollars into U.S. dollars, the monetary incentives would have been different for individual 
subjects in the individual-bidder and group-bidder experiments and the (Nash equilibrium) expected 
profits of bidders would have varied inversely with the square of the market size. 
The U.S. dollar incentives in the experiment were non-trivial.  Consider for example, the group 
bidder treatment with market size 7 and signal sample size 1 (treatment (5, 1, 7) in section 6 and Tables 
2 and 3).  The exchange rate was 9 experimental dollars per 1 U.S. dollar.  If in some auction round all 
bidders were to have bid naively and submitted bids equal to their signals, then the group with the high 
bid would have had an expected loss of 150 U.S. dollars from just this one “winning” bid. 
Many inexperienced individual and group bidding entities made winning bids that turned out to 
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be so high that they attained large negative cumulative payoffs. A nontrivial number of once-experienced 
and twice-experienced subjects also incurred negative balances. When a bidder’s cumulative payoffs 
were negative at the end of a session the loss was forgiven (the bidder was permitted to “go bankrupt”). 
Dismissing negative balance subjects from further participation was not an option in our experiment 
because: (a) we needed to keep market size constant, and therefore could not simply dismiss negative 
balance subjects during a session; and (b) experience was a treatment, and hence we could not substitute 
new subjects for bankrupt ones between sessions. In the data analysis reported in section 6 we delete 
observations for periods within a session with negative balance bidders.  Again, all bids by all bidders 
within a treatment session are deleted for all periods following the bankruptcy of any single bidder. 
Forgiving losses between sessions did not change the bidding strategies that are rational. The 
only way bidders could protect against loss of their endowments, and have prospects of earning higher 
payoffs, was to submit bids less than zerob given by equation (5).  Forgiving losses between sessions, and 
permitting subjects to begin anew at a subsequent session, is arguably a laboratory idealization of 
experience in the national economy. Recent studies have reported that only about 3% of publicly held 
companies in Chapter 11 bankruptcy are liquidated within 5 years (Alderson and Betker, 1999; Eberhart, 
Altman, and Aggarwal, 1999; Hotchkiss, 1995); others have debts forgiven and continue operating. 
6.  Bidding in the Auctions: Group vs. Individual Behavior 
Subjects in group treatments were informed that they were free to use their signal sheets in any way that 
they wished. Signals appeared to be freely shared within groups with 5 signals; some put their sheets 
together with tape or staples, and marked the low and high signals in each period. Others called out their 
signals for one member to record on one of the signal sheets.  Groups engaged in much discussion of 
how to proceed, often mapping out several periods with their decision strategy prior to entering a bid in 
the first practice period. All groups used at least one calculator. Ex post examination of the written-on 
sheets, revealed that many groups averaged their signals. One group even brought a laptop on the 3rd 
day and used a spreadsheet model. All of the groups appeared peer-oriented. Upon debriefing, groups 
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commented on how important it was for them to “achieve consensus” before entering a bid. 
Inspection of data from the experiment indicates that both individuals and groups are very 
subject to the winner’s curse when they are inexperienced.  High rates of incidence of losses from the 
winner’s curse with inexperienced subjects can swamp experimental treatment effects. The more 
interesting data are for experienced subjects. Tables 1-3 report data from the final day’s bidding in each 
treatment. 
The salient monetary rewards earned by subjects on the final day are reported in Table 1, as are 
the experimental/U.S. dollar exchange rates used in the treatments. There were large differences between 
the lowest and highest earnings in all treatments.  Non-bankrupt bidder averages are shown in the third 
column of Table 1. As explained in section 5, our experimental design involves manipulation of the 
exchange rate so as to keep the monetary incentives per individual approximately the same, regardless of 
market or group size.   
Tables 2 and 3 report random effects regressions in which the bidding entity (individual or group 
bidder) is the observation unit. The dependent variable is the amount of the bid and independent 
variables are signal sample midrange and range. In order to identify treatment effects, we interact 
midrange and range with dummy variables for the (G, S, N) treatments where: G denotes the size of the 
bidding Group (1 for individuals or 5 for five-person groups); S denotes the Signal sample size (1 or 5); 
and N denotes the Number of bidding entities in the auction (3 or 7).  The coefficient estimates are 
reported as deviations from the theoretical values in equation (5): estimated intercepts are reported as 
deviations from ( 1) /( 1)N Nθ− − + ; estimated midrange slope coefficients are reported as deviations 
from 1; and estimated range slope coefficients are reported as deviations from ( 1) / 2( 1)N N− + .   
6.1  Comparison of the Performance of Individual and Group Bidders 
First consider the parameter estimates reported in Table 2 for all bidders. The first two columns of Table 
2 report the central comparison for market size 3 (i.e. N = 3): a treatment using individual bidders (i.e. G 
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= 1) and signal sample size 1 (i.e. S = 1) is compared with a treatment using group bidders (i.e. G = 5) 
and signal sample size 5 (i.e. S = 5).  Comparison of the estimated intercept and slope deviations from 
the values in equation (5) provides a measure of the departure from rational bidding by the bidders in an 
experiment.  Equation (5) shows that bidders with a single signal in an N = 3 market need to discount 
their signals by at least 900 (= )1/()1( +− NNθ for N = 3 and θ  = 1800) in order to avoid the winner’s 
curse. The reported intercept deviation of +66 in the (G, S, N) = (1,1,3) column means that bidders in this 
individual bidder treatment with signal sample size 1 discounted their signals by only 834; hence they 
nominally failed to discount their signals sufficiently to avoid the winner’s curse but this deviation was 
insignificantly different from 0 by a one-tailed 5% t-test.  In comparison, bidders in the (5,5,3) group 
bidder treatment with signal sample size 5 had a nominal intercept deviation of +275 but this deviation 
was also insignificantly different from 0.  The midrange slope deviations for both types of bidding 
entities and the range slope deviation for group bidders are all less than 1.5% of their theoretical values 
and insignificantly different from zero by a two-tailed 5% t-test. 
The third and fourth columns of Table 2 compare the performance of bidders in individual and 
group bidding treatments with a market size of 7. The intercept deviation for individual bidders with 
signal sample size of 1 (treatment (1, 1, 7)) is +371 whereas it is +268 for groups with signal sample size 
of 5. In this comparison, group bidders with more information are nominally farther from winner’s curse 
bidding than are individuals with less information about the value of the auctioned item although neither 
deviation is significantly different from 0 (because of large standard errors). 
6.2  Comparison of the Performance of Individual and Group Winners 
 
It is germane to understanding the effects of bidding entity composition and item value information on 
the rationality of bidding behavior to analyze all bid data, as we do in Table 2.  But it is more central to 
understanding the incidence of the winner’s curse to analyze the winning bids, as we do in Table 3.   
Both individual and group high bidders with single signals do not deviate significantly from 
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minimally-rational bidding in either three bidder or seven bidder markets, as is clear from inspecting the 
results reported in Table 3 for treatments (1,1,3), (5,1,3), (1,1,7), and (5,1,7). Comparisons involving 
multiple signals tell a different story. 
The first two columns of Table 3 report the central comparison for winning bidders in market 
size 3. The reported intercept deviation of +31 in the (1,1,3) treatment is positive but not significant. In 
contrast, the intercept deviation for treatment (5,5,3) is +544, and significantly positive.  In this specific 
way, group high bidders with more information are less rational than individual high bidders in three 
bidder markets. The direction of the market size 7 comparison is the same; while the intercept deviation 
in treatment (1,1,7) is +284 it is much larger and significantly positive, at +1411, in treatment (5,5,7). 
Therefore group high bidders with more information are less rational than individual high bidders with 
less information in seven bidder markets as well as three bidder markets. 
  The intercept deviations for group high bidders with single signals are positive for the three 
bidder (treatment (5,1,3)) and negative for the seven bidder (treatment (5,1,7)) markets.  Individual high 
bidders with more information are rational in three bidder markets (treatment (1,5,3)) but not in seven 
bidder markets (treatment (1,5,7)); in the latter treatment the intercept deviation is +713 and, not 
surprisingly, significantly positive.    
The range deviation estimates reported in the third row of Table 3 provide insight into how more 
information about auctioned item values (signal sample size of 5 rather than 1) leads winning bidders 
into irrational bidding strategies, especially when they bid as groups rather than individuals.  The right 
hand side of equation (2) shows the minimum rational discount (MRD) from the naïve estimate of item 
value that is needed to avoid the winner’s curse when the bidder has a single signal. The size of the MRD 
is an increasing function of market size N. As has been emphasized in previous literature (e.g., Kagel and 
Levin, 1986; Cox, Dinkin, and Swarthout, 2001), many individual bidders with single value signals 
make too small signal discounts when N > 3.  The right hand side of the first line of equation (3) shows 
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two components of MRD in the multiple signal environment. The first component is the reduction in 
amount bid that corresponds to the MRD in single signal environments.  The second component is the 
partially offsetting increase in amount bid because of better information about item value in multiple 
signal environments with signal sample range r greater than 0. The pattern of deviations in treatments 
(5,5,3), (5,5,7), and (1,5,7) reveals that significantly positive deviations in intercepts are associated with 
significant deviations in range slopes (and insignificant deviations in midrange slopes). The positive 
intercept deviations reveal that high bidders in these three treatments generally did not discount their 
signals enough to avoid the winner’s curse.  This inconsistency with rational bidding was compounded 
by the irrational use of better information about the value of the auctioned item that is revealed by the 
significant deviations of the slope parameters for signal sample range from the theoretical values in 
equation (5).  These range-slope parameter deviations indicate that high bidders did not rationally change 
their bid discounts when signal sample range decreased (or the informativeness of the signal sample 
decreased).  The range-slope deviations are significant for group bidders in both three bidder and seven 
bidder markets but only for the larger, seven bidder markets for the individual bidders.  This range-slope 
comparison reinforces the above comparison of significant intercept deviations for individual and group 
bidders. Individual bidders with signal sample size 5 deviate significantly from minimally-rational 
bidding in seven bidder markets but not in three bidder markets, whereas group bidders deviate 
significantly from minimally-rational bidding in both the smaller and larger markets.   
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
Are group winning bidders more or less subject to the winner’s curse than individual high bidders in 
common value auctions?  Our research suggests that the answer depends upon the defining 
characteristics of groups. If groups are characterized as decision-making entities consisting of 
individuals with distinct information, then comparison of winning bids from treatments involving 
groups, with signal sample size of 5, with treatments involving individuals, with signal sample size of 1, 
supports the conclusion that groups are less rational than individuals.  On the other hand, if groups 
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consist of individuals that have common information then comparison of high bids from treatments 
involving groups, with signal sample size of 1, with treatments involving individuals, with signal sample 
size of 1, does not support a conclusion that groups are less or more rational than individuals. 
We think that it is a surprising feature of our results that more information about the value of the 
auctioned item causes both individuals and groups to deviate further from rational bidding and that this 
“curse of information” is worse for groups than for individuals.  Our experiment data do not support 
analysis that has appeared in previous literature.  Hoffman, et al. (1991) explained the prevalence of joint 
bids for offshore oil leases as not resulting from anti-competitive efforts to reduce competition in the 
auction but, instead, as a result of firms’ efforts to avoid the winner’s curse because “…with several 
signals to compare, firms can better identify and filter out exceptionally high signals” (p. 103).  Our 
experiment data contradict this analysis in that we find that our groups’ performance deteriorates 
significantly when they have “several signals to compare.” 
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Endnotes 
*  Financial support was provided by the Decision Risk and Management Science Program of the 
National Science Foundation (grant numbers SES-9818561 and SES- 9819031).  Helpful comments 
and suggestions were  provided by the special issue editors and referees.  
1.  It is important to point out in this context that all except one of the first author’s previous papers 
involving rational agent models have used individuals as decision-makers. 
2.  Of course, for the special case of signal sample size of 1, the sample midrange equals the signal and 
the sample range equals 0. 
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      Table 1.  Salient Earnings for Twice-Experienced Subjects 
 
(G, S, N)a Exch. Rate Averageb Low High 
1, 1, 3 200 $ 17.64 $ 0 $ 38.33 
5, 5, 3 150 
(30) 
$ 17.09 
($85.43) 
$ 0        
($ 0) 
$ 29.26 
($146.33)
1, 1, 7 43 $ 32.72 $ 0 $ 54.67 
5, 5, 7 45 
(9) 
$ 23.24 
($116.18)
$ 0        
($ 0) 
$ 39.66 
($198.33)
1, 5, 3 200 $ 17.08 $ 0 $ 28.70 
5, 1, 3 200 
(40) 
$ 25.28 
($126.40)
$ 0        
($ 0) 
$ 39.58 
($197.90)
1, 5, 7 43 $ 24.91 $  0 $ 58.47 
5, 1, 7 45 
(9) 
$ 46.94 
($234.71)
$ 0       
($ 0) 
$ 123.63 
($618.44)
 
a. (G, S, N) = Group size, Signal sample size, Number of bidders. 
b. Figures in parentheses are earnings for the whole group. 
 
 
Table 2. Bidding Behavior by Twice-Experienced (All) Bidders 
 
 (G,S,N) TREATMENTS 
 (1,1,3) (5,5,3) (1,1,7) (5,5,7) (1,5,3) (5,1,3) (1,5,7) (5,1,7) 
Intercept 
Deviation 
+66 
(723.7) 
+275 
(708.7) 
+371 
(509.9) 
+268 
(567.3) 
-252 
(878.8) 
-6 
(585.6) 
+368 
(431.9) 
+741 
(482.0) 
Midrange 
Deviation 
-0.014 
(0.023) 
-0.020 
(0.019) 
-0.036# 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.015) 
-0.017 
(0.024) 
-0.016 
(0.018) 
-0.035# 
(0.012) 
-0.132# 
(0.016) 
Range 
Deviation 
… +0.163 
(0.166) 
… +0.246 
(0.134) 
+0.333 
(0.206) 
… +0.150 
(0.104) 
… 
Number of 
Observations 
156 223 338 386 127 244 708 365 
R2 = 0.86         
 
# Significantly different from the theoretical value by a two-tailed 5% t-test. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3. Bidding Behavior by Twice-Experienced Winners 
 
 (G,S,N) TREATMENTS 
 (1,1,3) (5,5,3) (1,1,7) (5,5,7) (1,5,3) (5,1,3) (1,5,7) (5,1,7) 
Intercept 
Deviation 
+31 
(203.9) 
+544* 
(230.7) 
+284 
(225.4) 
+1411* 
(266.4) 
-270 
(351.2) 
+98 
(157.4) 
+713* 
(187.7) 
-49 
(195.9) 
Midrange 
Deviation 
-0.009 
(0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.012) 
+0.014 
(0.008) 
-0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.020# 
(0.007) 
-0.007 
(0.006) 
+0.010 
(0.01) 
Range 
Deviation 
… +0.113# 
(0.061) 
… -0.116# 
(0.091) 
+0.352 
(0.104) 
… +0.211# 
(0.06) 
… 
Number of 
Observations 
52 74 48 55 49 81 101 52 
R2 = 0.99         
 
* Significantly greater than the minimum rational discount by a one-tailed 5% t-test. 
# Significantly different from the theoretical value by a two-tailed 5% t-test. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
